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# AC

## Framework

I value morality. The standard is maximizing expected well being.

1. Actor Specificity- Collective action results in tradeoffs and conflicts that only act util can resolve- policies must maximize expected wellbeing. Woller[[1]](#footnote-1) ’97 Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's ex- pense. Consequently, public **policies in a democracy must be justified to the public**, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such **[but] justification cannot** simply **be assumed** a priori **by** invoking some higher-order **moral principle.** Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that **p**ublic policies inevitably entail trade-offsamong competing values. Thus **since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public** in any philosophical sense, **and** since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty [is] to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their polices are somehow to the overall advantage of society. At the same time, **deontologically based** ethical **systems have severe practical limitations** as a basis for public policy. At best,[Also,] **a priori moral principles** provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they **create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem** or actually making it worse.

Reject autonomy freedom and deontological based constraints because they paralyze state action- it’s impossible to weigh tradeoffs inherent to decisions involving opportunity costs and some constraint will always be violated. Woller indicates the existence of side constraints doesn’t disprove the utilitarian argument- the reason they exist because a pattern of general consistency with the side constraints maximizes utility overall, so in instances of harm it’s obligatory to violate the constraint.

2. Epistemology- Non-natural theories are epistemically inaccessible. Papineau[[2]](#footnote-2)

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, **any** such **non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties,** deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. **If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world** (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, **knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.**

That commits us to maximizing expected well being. Naturalism says goodness judgements are relative to the life form, because the life form explains the standard of evaluation for a good object and explains why objects satisfy the standard. It’s no accident that objects who are subject to the form satisfy the form, just like it’s no accident for a dog to have four legs. This is only true if the life form perpetuates it self, since that ensures it’s no accident the form satisfies the standard to be of the form. Species must act in a accordance with it’s perpetuation, so we should maximize life.

## Plan Text

The Islamic Republics of Afghanistan and Pakistan will significantly limit the extraction of minerals, in line with relevant provisions of the Global Witnesses’s proposed amendment to the 2013 Mining Law. Funding through normal means, I reserve the right to clarify. They write[[3]](#footnote-3)

>> In a highly conflict-affected country, there are no provisions to ensure mining does not create conflict, either by supporting illegal armed groups, or as a result of the actions of security forces protecting mining operations. Armed groups funded by minerals can generate enormous destruction – a danger which is clear from not just from places like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), but from Afghan examples like the militia forces involved in chromite mining in Kunar province. [1] **A prohibition on armed groups** **benefiting from mining, and local consultation** on security, would help.>> There is little detail in the draft law on bidding and contracting procedures or on mining royalties and revenues (less than in the current law). Bidding processes are often abused to deprive the State of large amounts of revenue. [2] **The law should set out** strong principles for fair, competitive and transparent bidding, like **clear criteria for eligibility and equal treatment for all companies. [3] The law should** also **require** that not just royalties but ***all* mining income**, including taxes and fees, should **be paid into a single**, **transparent account.**>> The law requires the largest Minerals Development Contracts to be published, but has nothing specifically requiring the publication of ordinary mining contracts and related documents – a step back from the government’s welcome decision in 2012 to publish most existing contracts. Without published contracts, Afghans will have no way to understand if a particular mining deal is good or bad for the country and whether it is being properly implemented.>> While the law has some welcome provisions for transparency (including for the first time a default presumption that documents will be non-confidential), a clear requirement to publish the real, beneficial ownership of companies applying for licenses would help prevent corruption and conflicts of interest. There are many examples of shell companies being used to avoid taxes or hide the award of contracts through corruption and undue influence.>> The law could be interpreted to give companies an unlimited right to use water – potentially causing major environmental damage and putting thousands of livelihoods at risk. The current law has clearer protections against over-use.>> [4] **The law requires environmental safeguards and community development measures**, but only after a license is granted – it does not clearly require companies or the government to assess and take into account the concerns of local communities, or potential environmental and social impacts, when making a bid or deciding which bid to accept.>> [5]**The** new **law requires** employment of “Afghan nationals” – unlike the 2010 legislation. But it does not specifically require **efforts to employ local communities in mining areas** – potentially reducing their stake in a project and increasing the risk of conflict. The possibility that outside workers could be used in places like Hajigak has already caused tensions.>> Articles in the law on resolving disputes and grievances around mining provide for independent arbitration, but do not clearly guarantee some important principles and safeguards like accessibility. Provisions splitting the costs of arbitration between the parties, for example, could potentially exclude poor communities affected by mining. Communities which are not able to resolve their complaints might instead turn to the armed opposition.>> The law requires that Contracts be approved by a ministerial Commission, but independent scrutiny of mining could have been strengthened by a stronger recognition of the investigative and reviewing role of Parliament. [6] **Community monitoring of mining**, and an independent advisory board of different stake-holders **could** also help **reinforce scrutiny** – for example **by ensuring environmental and social plans were properly developed** and carried out**.[7] The law has articles on resettlement**, compulsory purchase, **and damage to land** or property, but it does not set out many of the key principles which should govern its application on these points – like compensation for loss of livelihood as well as just the market value of land. This increases the potential for unfairness or abuses.[8]The new law mainly gives rights and compensation to *owners* of land, but not to legal occupants,even where they may have been legitimately settled on the land for many years. This could potentially mean that villagers renting their land get nothing if it is damaged by mining activity.

## Harms

Unconstrainted resource extraction causes Afghan instability- supercharges corruption and political conflict, empirically. Behzan[[4]](#footnote-4) ‘13

**Afghanistan's** mineral wealth is closely tied to its future prospects. If managed well, the theory goes, the mining sector could be the backbone of a sustainable economy, fund national security, and stabilize the government. But the country's **natural resources could** just as easily undercut Kabul's efforts to stand on its own by **exacerbat[e]**ing **corruption**, forcing a sell-off of prized assets to foreign investors, and **becoming** yet **another source of violent conflict**.Based on its handling of the mining sector, observers say, it looks like Afghanistan is on course to join the raft of countries afflicted by the "resource curse." The Mines and Petroleum Ministry estimates that **Afghanistan boasts** oil, gas, iron ore, copper, and gold **deposits worth** about **$1 trillion**. **Kabul hopes to generate** **about $4 billion a year** in mining and energy revenue over the next decade. Yet **in 2012, the two** **sectors brought in less than $150 million** combined. Stephen Carter, the Afghanistan campaign leader at Global Witness, a London-based nongovernmental organization that investigates links between natural resources, conflict, and corruption, says **the government has lacked control over its resource wealth**. "The sector, as a whole, is operating in a very uncontrolled way. There's no oversight," Carter says. "We fear that there is this sense that 'we must exploit, we must get this going as quickly as possible.' That's understandable, but if that comes at the expense of taking shortcuts in the control of the sector, I think it will be seen as a very poor decision in the future." Cash Cow?

The Afghan government has made the development of its commercial mining sector a top priority. Kabul is counting on the extraction of natural resources to bring in cash and create jobs as the bulk of foreign combat troops leave at the end of 2014 and international assistance winds down. But **there are** already worrying **signs that** the **competition over natural resources could spill over into** very real **fighting** **between rival** **ethnic and political groups.** **In** the northern province of **Badakhshan**, disputes have been reported between local leaders over control of the gold and precious-stones trade. In **Bamiyan Province**, locals have clashed with security commanders over ownership rights to mines. In **Paktia Province**, local militias have fought over the control of coal mines. **Fights** **have** also **erupted between the central government and provincial** and tribal **leaders** **in resource-rich areas**. Last month, a landmark oil project in the Amu Darya basin was halted less than a year after production began after engineers working for the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which along with an Afghan entity has the right to extract oil from the site, came under attack from a local militia. The government alleged that the militia was associated with General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former Uzbek warlord who serves as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the Afghan National Army. Kabul has accused Dostum of putting pressure on the CNPC to make illegal payoffs. Dostum has, in turn, rejected the allegations, accusing President Hamid Karzai of protecting the interests of the Watan Group, the Afghan company affiliated with his family that shares the drilling rights with the CNPC. Powerful Effect Carter says **Afghanistan's natural resources are** also **being used by** armed **groups to fund** conflict, much like the situation during the Soviet occupation and civil war, when various mujahedin factions smuggled precious stones, marble, and other minerals to Pakistan to raise funds. "There's funding for **insurgent groups** through the smuggling of timber in eastern Afghanistan," Carter says. "There's also funding for insurgents, but also local militias, from the smuggling of chromite. We also shouldn't underestimate the potential for a large mining operation to create internal rivalries within communities that could spill over to violence." **The three largest operations** in the country -- the Mes Aynak copper mine in eastern Logar Province, the Hajigak iron ore mine in Bamiyan Province, and the Amu Darya oil project in the country's north -- are all situated in relatively peaceful areas. But these areas **have witnessed growing instability** because militants, seeking to disrupt sources of government revenue and discourage foreign involvement in key industries, have targeted the projects. Potentially Disruptive Even **within the government itself,** **the internal battle for control** **over** Afghanistan's **mining and energy** sectors **has slowed efforts to put them under Kabul's authority**. Attempts to pass a new mining law that would regulate the industry and lure investors has been stuck in parliament for more than a year because of disputes between ministries vying to oversee the sector.Javed Noorani of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an Afghan nongovernmental organization, says greater transparency could help put an end to the graft that is behind many of the disputes. "There are so many levels of corruption," Noorani says. "When the government is shortlisting companies for a contract there's room for corruption. Even when you implement a contract there is corruption. There are maybe 100 points at which there's space for corruption."Noorani suggests that the government publicly reveal details of mining agreements, payments made by foreign mining companies to the government, and how revenues from the mineral wealth are used. Only by taking such steps toward transparency, he says, can Afghanistan find a way to use its natural resources as a catalyst and not a curse.

Also proves uniqueness- Afghanistan is stable post 2014 transition but implementation of resource extraction policy implodes stability shortly after.

## Inherency

Inherency- afghan mining law is stalled in parliament now- political barriers prevent passage. Murtazaie[[5]](#footnote-5) ‘14

A number of **Afghan officials** on Monday **raised concern over** the **stalemate facing the** new **mines law** in Parliament. They said the **failure to pass the law was** one of **the** major **cause**s **of declining investments** in Afghanistan.

The new draft of the mines law was initially dispatched to the House of Representatives on June 9 by the State Ministry For Parliamentary Affairs. The Afghan Investment Supporting Agency (AISA) has bemoaned that even with major foreign investments that could benefit the struggling Afghan economy on the line, eight months have been passed since the law was first brought to the Lower House. According to experts, political obstacles in the cabinet involving **accusations that the bill** **was prepared under** **the guidance of foreigners** and would not serve the interests of Afghanistan have **proved the major hindrance to passage**. The Ministry of Mines has rejected the accusations and defended the draft law. Meanwhile, **the Afghan Ministry of Mines & Petroleum** (MoMP) has **said** that **the delay** in approval of the mines law **was having detrimental effects on investment** in Afghanistan, **causing foreign companies** and governments **to** freeze or **completely withdraw funds** for new mining projects so long as the legal framework they would be working under remains in limbo.

## Solvency

Protection of community water and land is key to win allegiance of local populations- the plan provides civil oversight and regulations. Brown and Blankenship[[6]](#footnote-6) ‘13

Mining is tied to, and can impact, many of the natural resource challenges already discussed in this report, particularly those relating to land and water. **Mining, and** mine-**related infrastructure l**ike roads and railways, **require extensive land, often affect** significant quantities of **water and can generate** large volumes of **toxic waste** if not properly managed, presenting serious health risks and **damaging** other livelihoods such as **farming**. In each case, **the Afghan government needs to** calculate and **address** the **environmental** and social **costs** of mining to ensure they do not outweigh the financial environmental and social risks of mining between the Ministry of Mining and NEPA. **The government should ensure** that **all projects are subject to open**, independent **environmental impact assessment** processes, **and** that **mining companies adhere to best practice international standards for environmental** and social **protection**. **These include** **commitments for relocation** and compensation **for local communities**, environmental management practices in and around mine sites as well as remediation and mine closure. Given that the **informed participation of local populations and civil society groups is one of the best ways of both avoiding future conflict** and improving oversight of mining operations, and that the 2007 Environment Law expressly requires it143 , the government should endeavour to ensure meaningful participation by local communities in decisions over mining, encourage company-community engagement and develop mechanisms to raise and settle grievances (The Government is setting up a grievance system for the Aynak mine but it is not clear what steps will be taken to ensure that it is effective and has the confidence of the local communities).**The international community**, meanwhile, **can support the government** and particularly NEPA staff, **to assess** the **environmental impacts** of mining operations **and improve** their licensing, monitoring and **enforcement** **capacities.** The international community also needs to provide support to the civil society groups that can help local communities understand the facts about mining and represent their own concerns.

Focusing on local communities is the strongest link to national stability in Central Asia, empirically.Conway[[7]](#footnote-7) ‘12

Resource curse theories follow two tracks. On the first, the overwhelming revenue drawn from the sector exacerbates corruption within the government. That scenario is hardly difficult to imagine in Afghanistan, as the country is currently considered the second most corrupt in the world, according to Transparency International. On the second track, increased mineral exports strengthen a country's currency and consequently crowd out other sectors (such as agriculture) from being competitive on the world market. This is a threat in Afghanistan, clearly, as its economy is largely dependent on farming.  But several countries in Central Asia have struggled with exactly these challenges in recent decades -- and offer a valuable guide to Kabul, Washington, and international investors. Many states in the region are blessed with mineral wealth but cursed by infrastructure obstacles and social instability; accordingly, they have faced challenges in attracting foreign investors, cultivating resources without losing profits to graft, and avoiding introducing new divisions among the population. The most important lesson for **Afghanistan** to learn is that it **will have to build a resource-based economy with** the **support of local Afghans**. **Take Kyrgyzstan**, a mountainous, landlocked country with little rail infrastructure, deteriorating roads, and an economy based on foreign aid, remittances, and mining. Until recently, successive authoritarian leaders since the mid-1990s, such as Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, advised foreign mining companies to avoid getting involved locally; a few token social projects to placate the people living near a project would suffice. But **keeping out of local affairs** has **backfired**. Mining revenues were funneled to elites in the capital, and a negligible percentage went to the local community for development and infrastructure projects. Over time, local miners moved their families (and wealth) to the capital city; the loss of revenue and investment left the mining towns without running water or a functioning sewage system. In Barskaun, the only paved road is the one that leads to the mine -- Kumtor, a single gold mine, which represents ten percent of the country's GDP. That **neglect** not only shortchanged the locals but **breeds insecurity** today. In Aral, where there is a foreign-operated gold mine, armed men on horseback caused a million dollars' worth of damage in October 2011, forcing the site to remain closed until a settlement was reached with villagers three months later. But then **consider Kazakhstan,** where **the opposite has happened**. The country of 16 million is an oil and gas exporter but also a global leader in copper, iron ore, chromite, lead, zinc, gold, coal, and uranium reserves and production. Since its independence in the 1990s, both foreign investors and **government officials** have **focused on socioeconomic development in** the **areas surrounding** key **mining site**s; **today mines serve as a catalyst for province-wide growth**. Managers and workers live locally, spend locally, and educate their children locally. Astana has imposed strict requirements on foreign miners -- forcing them to sign annual memorandums of cooperation with local governors, under which both parties together determine the social investment projects to be funded by the firm in the province for that year. The strategy dates back to the Soviet era, when most of these mining operations had their hand in all aspects of the local community. Today this is reflected in foreign mining companies funding schools, gyms, sports stadiums, daycare centers, and orphanages and foster care networks, as well as providing electric-power capacity to homes and businesses across the country. Not coincidently, Kazakhstan ranks far ahead of all other Central Asian states on country risk indices for foreign investors.Unfortunately, at the moment Afghanistan is looking more like the former than the latter. Politically the country is already overly centralized in Kabul, and with Aynak and Hajigak within driving distance, it's not difficult to envision a future where the benefits of the extractive sector remain in the capital. Further, while all foreign developers are required to invest in development projects, it remains to be seen if these firms will make good on their promises and if local leaders will be empowered in the subsequent decision-making process. Whereas Kazakhstan enforces strict production and investment quotas -- if you don't produce and invest as you promised, you're out -- citing force majeure in Afghanistan (from war to civil disturbances to labor issues) seems like an easy way for Aynak and Hajigak to renege on local commitments, potentially aggravating the existing socioeconomic gap between Kabul and the rest of the country

Targeting nonstate actor extraction of minerals solves cycles of violence that cripple stability. Lakhani[[8]](#footnote-8) ‘13

Mining can contribute to violent conflict in Afghanistan in a number of interrelated ways beyond economic effects, such as by generating finances for armed nonstate actors, exacerbating tensions between and within social groups, and challenging the legitimacy of the government when it cannot effectively deliver benefits and mediate mining-related disputes. Challenges to state legitimacy have persistently undermined the achievement of security and development in Afghanistan. **Extraction activities**, while providing resources that could strengthen the state in the long term, disrupt social relations and **generate** tension and **conflict** in the short term. Settling these conflicts tests the ability of an already weak state; **failure to settle them deepens** the **lack of confidence in the state, encouraging cycles of violence** and depriving the state of the potential long-term benefits of extraction.

**Various** **actors exploit minerals** and routinely use violence in pursuit of their inter- ests.22 These actors include local **smuggling networks**, **warlords, and** other power bro- kers, as well as **insurgent groups** such as the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Existing small-scale **mineral exploitation is already contributing to** patronage systems, **criminal activities, corruption, and violence** in Afghanistan’s highly complex and entrenched war economy. Local mining helped finance anti-Taliban groups within the Northern Alliance in the 1990s, and **as late as 2005**—four years after the establishment of the post-Taliban government—nearly **80 percent of** all **Afghan mines were** reported to be **controlled by armed nonstate actors**.When informally controlled resources are transferred to formal state-recognized enti- ties as part of the statebuilding process, the loss of informal actors’ access to revenues can generate resentment and retaliation. **In** several recent cases in Afghanistan, the local population has supported nonstate actors in these disputes, rather than the state- licensed companies. The Aynak site in **Logar province**, which the state has licensed to Chinese-owned MCC, has been subject to attacks by local insurgent groups as well as growing dissatisfaction on the part of the local population.24 **Communities** **are displeased with the** MCC’s limited employment opportunities, the **effect of drilling on water levels** in wells, and the resettlement compensation the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum has offered. **Existing tensions between local communities**, returning displaced persons, and resettled households over land and water **have been exacerbated** **by** the resettlement of approximately 117 households from five villages directly affected by **the mine site**. **Dis- putes over access to agricultural** and grazing **land and water**—both **crucial issues already creating conflict in Afghanistan**—**are likely to grow as** the **extractives sector develops;**25 these complaints have already emerged, even though mining operations have not yet commenced.26 Similarly, conflict has emerged in Bamyan province, where the govern- ment concluded another contract with MCC to mine the province’s coal reserves. Local communities that depended on informal artisanal and noncommercial mining of the coal reserves27 there are finding that they have few other options for income generation. The state’s inability to address their grievances has led them to support insurgent groups.28 Logar and Bamyan provinces offer lessons and warnings for Afghanistan as it develops its natural resource strategy. Logar already saw high levels of contestation and violence before the mining contracts were issued, and the extraction activities can be understood as exacerbating existing conflicts. Bamyan has been one of the most peaceful provinces in Afghanistan over the past decade; there, the link between government inability to address grievances resulting from the mining contract and the initiation of violence is clear. **State capacities to mitigate the negative effects of mining operations,** provide economic opportu- nities for local residents, and deliver services financed by extraction **can be powerful mechanisms for undermining allegiances to illegal, nonstate armed groups.** Creating alternative incentives for actors that challenge the state could complement efforts to extend security across the country and help rebuild citizens’ trust in the state. 29 For weak states, however, there are significant obstacles to turning this theory into practice.

Government arbitration of land disputes creates a positive feedback loop for governmental legitimacy. Sexton[[9]](#footnote-9) ‘12

With the above risks in mind, however, **ecological considerations have the potential to** be a method of **de-politicizing** **natural resource conflicts** **by asserting public stewardship of a common environmental resource**, rather than allowing the resource to be controlled by one party or the other. **In the case of the Shinwari land conflict** (Case 4) **the provincial government,** seeing that there was no obvious solution to the land dispute between the Sipai and Alisherkhel, instead **declared** that **the land was owned by the government**. **They** did not use overt environmental language in the pronouncements, but **noted** that there is a **scarcity of land in Nangarhar province** (the most densely populated province in Afghanistan) and that this specific tract **was to be protected** **and administered** by the authorities **for the public good** -- exactly the logic that many environmentalists espouse.**For conflicts over access to** or ownership of water, land or **minerals**, there may be circumstances where the **authorities**, whether formal or informal leaders, could **use** **ecological concerns** for long term resource accessibility and the logic of the public good **to bar several conflicting parties from a resource in dispute**.

Unilateral appropriation of mining contracts creates legitimacy and solves factional division in Kabul.. Bowley[[10]](#footnote-10) ‘12

KALU VALLEY, Afghanistan — If there is a road to a happy ending in Afghanistan, much of the path may run underground: in the trillion-dollar reservoir of natural resources — oil, gold, iron ore, copper, lithium and other minerals — that has brought hopes of a more self-sufficient country, if only the wealth can be wrested from blood-soaked soil. But the wealth has inspired darker dreams as well. Officials and industry experts say the potential resource boom seems increasingly imperiled by corruption, violence and intrigue, and has put the Afghan government’s vulnerabilities on display. It all comes at what is already a critically uncertain time here, **with** the **impending departure of NATO** troops **in 2014** **and** old regional and **ethnic rivalries resurfacing**, raising concerns that the **mineral wealth** **could** **be**come the **fuel for civil conflict.** Powerful regional warlords and militant leaders are jockeying to widen their turf to include areas with mineral wealth, and the Taliban have begun to make murderous incursions into territory where development is planned. **In** the capital, **Kabul**, **factional maneuvering** **is in** full **swing**, **including disputes ove**r lucrative **side contracts** awarded to relatives of President Hamid Karzai. Further, a proposed mining law vital to attracting foreign investment is up in the air, with the delay threatening several projects. The cabinet rejected it this summer, saying it was too generous to Western commercial interests. But some Western officials fear other motives are at work, too, including an internal fight for spoils, and perhaps an effort by some neighboring countries to sway sympathetic officials to keep Indian and Chinese state mining companies out. “If you were to pick a country that involves high risk in developing a new mining sector, Afghanistan is it,” said Eleanor Nichol, campaign leader at Global Witness, a group that tries to break the link between natural resources, corruption and conflict. “But the genie is out of the bottle.” Already this summer, the China National Petroleum Corporation, in partnership with a company controlled by relatives of President Karzai, began pumping oil from the Amu Darya field in the north. An investment consortium arranged by JPMorgan Chase is mining gold. Another Chinese company is trying to develop a huge copper mine. Four copper and gold contracts are being tendered, and contracts for rare earth metals could be offered soon. The Ministry of Mines has also requested bids for a richer oil concession in the Afghan-Tajik basin, and American officials are optimistic it could come online soon. And in the shadow of the Black Mountain, here in the Kalu Valley in remote Bamian Province, villagers hope that Indian and Canadian mining operations can turn buried iron ore into new lives for struggling families, breaking a cycle of poverty in this high place cut off by snow for six months of the year. When the digging begins, Abbas Ali, a 30-year-old farmer here, will have to give up the four-acre potato field his family has worked for generations. He is more than ready. “Our life will change 180 degrees,” Mr. Ali said this summer, staring up with fervent brown eyes at the bowed wooden roof beams in the white-walled madrasa where he teaches for extra income. “We support any effort to make it happen quickly.” That hope, and the prospect of more self-sufficiency as international aid ebbs, is driving Afghan officials like the minister of mines, Wahidullah Shahrani, as he tries to get more projects going. The World Bank estimates that if things go very well, mining and agriculture together could raise annual growth rates by 3 to 4 percentage points between now and 2025. But Mr. Shahrani is concerned about striking the right balance between generating revenue for the Afghan government and drawing in international investors, saying that getting contracts wrong would jeopardize critical development timelines.This is all about the credibility of the country,” he said. There are other concerns, too. Some **officials are worried about** a swath of small **mines** — for gemstones, marble, chromite and other resources — **that are** **out of the state’s control** **and** might be **fueling the insurgency**. A recent Defense Department analysis said criminal mining syndicates were smuggling chromite over the border, paying protection money to the Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani insurgent network. In the border province of Khost, the director of mines, Laiq Muhammad, said more than half the chromite there had been extracted illegally and smuggled to Pakistan, with no benefit to Afghanistan. “Not even one afghani has been added to national income from chromite mining,” he said. Senior Pentagon officials say they are trying hard to bring the mines into the legitimate economy by finding international buyers for the chromite. In Bamian, up on the mountain above Abbas Ali’s home, 12 new wooden and brick security huts march across the hillsides of the 230-square-mile concession area, a sign of intent — maybe — that the soil will soon be broken and the mine’s promise fulfilled. But they are also a nod to the possibly more violent times ahead. Bamian’s chief geologist Mohammad Amin, 27, was striding through the boulders scattered on the hillside. “If the Taliban are able to make it to this part of the country, this project will be halted and nobody will be able to work,” he said. There are signs, in fact, that is happening in this part of Bamian, which until the past year had been considered relatively secure. Now, the road to Kabul is no longer safe for foreigners, and there has been a string of attacks on government officials and security forces.Beyond the concerns about security, there is the matter of creating the mines themselves. The prospecting project here — named Hajigak, after one of the treeless mountain ridges — has long been marked by yellow stripes. They are Soviet survey ditches, testament to efforts decades ago to tap Bamian’s iron ore that never panned out.**Before mining can actually begin, there is a need for a power plant**, a smelter, and a road to bring the ore down the pristine red-rock ravines of the Kalu Valley. There are also plans for a major railroad — a first on a large scale for Afghanistan — to take the iron ore out, perhaps west to an Iranian port or to join up with a rail route promised by the Chinese from the Mes Aynak copper mine east to Pakistan or north to Turkmenistan. The Mes Aynak mine, in Logar Province, is another trove of potential Afghan wealth awarded to the Chinese in 2007. It is already behind schedule, and no work has begun on a railroad yet. Mr. Shahrani is adamant mining will start in two years and blames the discovery of Buddhist ruins and artifacts, as well as Soviet-era mines that had to be cleared, for the delay. But in a country where the future always seems to be put off, the **delays** may also **reflect an unwillingness**, say officials who work closely with the mining industry, **by international investors to put** in hundreds of millions of **dollars** they could lose if Afghanistan again descends into turmoil. “Everyone is hesitant to plan beyond 2014,” said a Western official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “They have dragged their feet. The government might change and you have built your new roads and new power plants. It might all be gone.” **Doubts** **about** **the government’s role in any resource boom** **loom** **large** for the Afghan public, too, **where there is** deep **skepticism that** **the weak state** and notoriously kleptocratic ministries **can build a** **functioning mining economy** that will help ordinary people. Some outsiders fear that the recent delay in the new mining law represented, in the messy world of Afghan politics, an attempt to discredit Mr. Shahrani and win control of the mining ministry, one of the government’s most lucrative power bases. **Already, there are examples of how resource riches can spark conflict**.At the Amu Darya oil field in June, President Karzai’s government accused a rival, the warlord Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, of putting pressure on the Chinese oil company to make illegal payoffs. General Dostum’s party said he wanted the Chinese only to hire more local labor. And at Mes Aynak, where the government says nine villages were displaced, the mining project has caused tensions among locals contending for compensation for their land. As the details of the Hajigak contract are negotiated, the people of Bamian are clear about what they want in return for opening their lands to mining: paved roads, a gymnasium, a conference hall, a technical college, and guaranteed work for locals among the 50,000 jobs some say the mine could generate. Hoping to avoid the frictions that have arisen at other sites, they have formed a 114-member commission to work on issues like compensation and jobs and provide a mechanism for airing grievances. Some of the people of Bamian — most of whom are Hazaras, wearily familiar with years of ethnic oppression by those in power in Kabul — remain dubious that wealth will automatically come their way. But there is still hope in the valley of the Black Mountain, in Abbas Ali’s village. At a store in the dusty bazaar, Shir Ali, 38, a gangly man who drives a minibus, says that with a job as a day laborer or security guard or driver, he could buy uniforms and textbooks to send all of his 12 children to school. Sitting at the counter behind open sacks of rice and beans, the storekeeper, Daoud, 38, cracks his bronzed face with a smile, sharing the optimism but also the trepidation about whether at last his country can really make something of itself. “If the mine doesn’t come, we will be like those people who live on treasure,” he said, “but they cannot use it.” Matthew Rosenberg contributed reporting from Kabul, Afghanistan; Habib Zahori from Bamian Province, Afghanistan; and an employee of The New York Times from Khost Province, Afghanistan.

## Advantage 1: Nuclear Terrorism

Afghanistan instability spills over, destabilizes Pakistan, causes nuclear terrorism and Russia US war. Miller[[11]](#footnote-11) ‘12

It was, of course, al-Qaeda’s attack on the US homeland that triggered the intervention in Afghanistan, but wars, once started, always involve broader considerations than those present at the firing of the first shot. The war in **Afghanistan** now **affects** all of America’s interests across South Asia: **Pakistan’s stability and** the security of **its nuclear weapons**, **NATO’s credibility**, **relations with Iran and Russia, transnational drug-trafficking networks**, and more. America leaves the job in Afghanistan unfinished at its peril. The chorus of voices in the Washington policy establishment calling for withdrawal is growing louder. In response to this pressure, President Obama has pledged to withdraw the surge of thirty thousand US troops by September 2012—faster than US military commanders have recommended—and fully transition leadership for the country’s security to the Afghans in 2013. These decisions mirror the anxieties of the electorate: fifty-six percent of Americans surveyed recently by the Pew Research Center said that the US should remove its troops as soon as possible. But it is not too late for Obama (who, after all, campaigned in 2008 on the importance of Afghanistan, portraying it as “the good war” in comparison to Iraq) to reformulate US strategy and goals in South Asia and explain to the American people and the world why an ongoing commitment to stabilizing Afghanistan and the region, however unpopular, is nonetheless necessary he Afghanistan Study Group, a collection of scholars and former policymakers critical of the current intervention, argued in 2010 that al-Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan and is unlikely to return, even if Afghanistan reverts to chaos or Taliban rule. It argued that three things would have to happen for al-Qaeda to reestablish a safe haven and threaten the United States: “1) the Taliban must seize control of a substantial portion of the country, 2) Al Qaeda must relocate there in strength, and 3) it must build facilities in this new ‘safe haven’ that will allow it to plan and train more effectively than it can today.” Because all three are unlikely to happen, the Study Group argued, al-Qaeda almost certainly will not reestablish a presence in Afghanistan in a way that threatens US security. In fact, none of those three steps are necessary for **al-Qaeda** to regain its safe haven and threaten America. The group **could return** to Afghanistan even if the Taliban do not take back control of the country. It could—and probably would—find safe haven there if Afghanistan relapsed into chaos or civil war. Militant groups, including al-Qaeda offshoots, have gravitated toward other failed states, like Somalia and Yemen, but Afghanistan remains especially tempting, given the network’s familiarity with the terrain and local connections. Nor does al-Qaeda, which was never numerically overwhelming, need to return to Afghanistan “in strength” to be a threat. Terrorist operations, including the attacks of 2001, are typically planned and carried out by very few people. Al-Qaeda’s resilience, therefore, means that stabilizing Afghanistan is, in fact, necessary even for the most basic US war aims. The international community should not withdraw until there is an Afghan government and Afghan security forces with the will and capacity to deny safe haven without international help. Setting aside the possibility of al-Qaeda’s reemergence, the United States has other important interests in the region as well—notably preventing **the Taliban** from gaining enough power to **destabilize** neighboring **Pakistan**, which, for all its recent defiance, is officially a longstanding American ally. (It signed two mutual defense treaties with the United States in the 1950s, and President Bush designated it a major non-NATO ally in 2004.) **State failure** in Pakistan brokered by the Taliban **could** **mean** regional chaos and a possible **loss of control of its nuclear weapons**. Preventing such a catastrophe is clearly a vital national interest of the United States and cannot be accomplished with a few drones. Alarmingly, Pakistan is edging toward civil war. A collection of militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), among others, are fighting an insurgency that has escalated dramatically since 2007 across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan. According to the Brookings Institution’s Pakistan Index, insurgents, militants, and terrorists now regularly launch more than one hundred and fifty attacks per month on Pakistani government, military, and infrastructure targets. In a so far feckless and ineffectual response, Pakistan has deployed nearly one hundred thousand regular army soldiers to its western provinces. At least three thousand soldiers have been killed in combat since 2007, as militants have been able to seize control of whole towns and districts. Tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians and militants—the distinction between them in these areas is not always clear—have been killed in daily terror and counterterror operations. The two **insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked**. Defeating the Afghan Taliban would give the United States and Pakistan momentum in the fight against the Pakistani Taliban. A **Taliban takeover** in Afghanistan, on the other hand, **will give new strength to the Pakistani insurgency**, which would gain an ally in Kabul, safe haven to train and arm and from which to launch attacks into Pakistan, and a huge morale boost in seeing their compatriots win power in a neighboring country. Pakistan’s collapse or fall to the Taliban is (at present) unlikely, but the implications of that scenario are so dire that they cannot be ignored. **Even short of** a **collapse**, **increasing** chaos and **instability** in Pakistan **could give cover for terrorists to** increase the intensity and scope of their operations, perhaps even to achieve the cherished goal of **steal**ing **a nuclear weapon**.

lthough our war there has at times seemed remote, Afghanistan itself occupies crucial geography. Situated between Iran and Pakistan, bordering China, and within reach of Russia and India, it sits on a crossroads of Asia’s great powers. This is why it has, since the nineteenth century, been home to the so-called Great Game—in which the US should continue to be a player.Two other players, Russia and Iran, are aggressive powers seeking to establish hegemony over their neighbors. Iran is seeking to build nuclear weapons, has an elite military organization (the Quds Force) seeking to export its Islamic Revolution, and uses the terror group Hezbollah as a proxy to bully neighboring countries and threaten Israel. Russia under Vladimir Putin is seeking to reestablish its sphere of influence over its near abroad, in pursuit of which it (probably) cyber-attacked Estonia in 2007, invaded Georgia in 2008, and has continued efforts to subvert Ukraine. Iran owned much of Afghan territory centuries ago, and continues to share a similar language, culture, and religion with much of the country. It maintains extensive ties with the Taliban, Afghan warlords, and opposition politicians who might replace the corrupt but Western-oriented Karzai government. Building a stable government in Kabul will be a small step in the larger campaign to limit Tehran’s influence.Russia remains heavily involved in the Central Asian republics. It has worked to oust the United States from the air base at Manas, Kyrgyzstan. It remains interested in the huge energy reserves in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russia may be wary of significant involvement in Afghanistan proper, unwilling to repeat the Soviet Union’s epic blunder there. But a US withdrawal from Afghanistan followed by Kabul’s collapse would likely embolden Russia to assert its influence more aggressively elsewhere in Central Asia or Eastern Europe, especially in the Ukraine.A US departure from Afghanistan will also continue to resonate for years to come in the strength and purpose of NATO. Every American president since Harry Truman has affirmed the centrality of the Atlantic Alliance to US national security. The war in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Alliance’s first out-of-area operation in its sixty-year history, was going poorly until the US troop surge. Even with the limited success that followed, allies have complained that the burden in Afghanistan has been distributed unevenly. Some, like the British, Canadians, and Poles, are fighting a shooting war in Kandahar and Helmand, while others, like the Lithuanians and Germans, are doing peacekeeping in Ghor and Kunduz. The poor command and control—split between four regional centers—left decisionmaking slow and poorly coordinated for much of the war. ISAF’s strategy was only clarified in 2008 and 2009, when Generals David McKiernan and Stanley McChrystal finally developed a more coherent campaign plan with counterinsurgency-appropriate rules of engagement.**A bad end in Afghanistan could** **have dire consequences for the Atlantic Alliance**, **leaving** the organization’s future, and especially **its credibility as a deterrent to Russia, in question**. It would not be irrational for a Russian observer of the war in Afghanistan to conclude that **if NATO cannot** make tough **decisions**, field effective fighting forces, or distribute burdens evenly**, it cannot defend Europe**. The United States and Europe must prevent that outcome by salvaging a credible result to its operations in Afghanistan—one that both persuades Russia that NATO is still a fighting alliance and preserves the organization as a pillar of US national security.

Independently, illegal resource extraction fuels cross border terrorism. DuPee[[12]](#footnote-12) ‘12

The illegal acquisition and seizure of land, black market mining, and the trafficking of these resources surged following the collapse of the Taliban regime in November 2001. In 2005, the Afghan Ministry for Mines and Industries indicated nearly 80% of all Afghan mines remained under control of rogue commanders or criminals, with some of these mines being controlled by non-state actors since 1992.[12] **Several of Afghanistan’s most** contested and **insurgent plagued areas**—such as Khost, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, and Baghlan provinces—also **contain large mineral deposits** and precious stone mines. Bordering the restive tribal areas of Pakistan, **Khost** Province **is home to** a number of **criminal mining syndicates**, many of **which specialize in** the surface **extraction of chromite**.[13] In May 2010, the director of Khost’s mining department, Engineer Laiq, admitted **the provincial government has failed to prevent** the **smuggling** and illegal extraction of Khost’s chromite ore despite the presence of 300 armed security guards tasked with securing the mines.[14] Afghan security officials indicate these syndicates are small in number, namely a few large families, who smuggle the ore across the border to Pakistan where members of the Wazir tribe buy and trade the mineral to international customers. Analysts previously speculated that the illegal extraction of chromite in Khost amounts to nearly 20 million Afghanis ($413,907) per year, although the Afghan government believes it loses one million Afghanis ($20,695) in lost revenue from illegal chromite excavations in Khost each day.[15] Besides lost revenue, **the Afghan government faces a growing threat from the merger between corrupt** business **elites and** local **criminal syndicates who outsource** chromite smuggling **operations** and pay “protection” fees **to** members of **Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan** (TTP) **and Haqqani network** affiliates to ensure that the movement of illegally mined chromites reach market destinations in Pakistan without interference. The most powerful of these syndicates was led by a licit and licensed mining company that excavated chromite ore in Khost for three years without paying royalties to the government, and used a network of local smugglers from the Tanai tribe to illegally smuggle the ore to North Waziristan where members of the TTP would ensure the convoys were safely escorted in exchange for a payment.[16]Many of those involved in the smuggling include members of the Zadran tribe, the same tribal affiliation of the much vaunted Haqqani network, while those in charge of chromite trading belong to the Madda Khel clan of the Utman Wazir tribe, the same tribe and clan of wanted Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar.[17] These connections have not been lost on **security forces** operating in eastern Afghanistan who **face a multifaceted threat from** local Taliban **insurgents** being **supplied with** deadly **i**mprovised **e**xplosive **d**evice**s** **and suicide bombers from** Hafiz Gul Bahadar and **the Haqqani network**, as well as the **[and] TTP**.Between March and October 2011, at least two U.S. drone strikes targeted Taliban fighters who were loyal to Pakistani Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar and linked to the smuggling and trading of chromite. On March 17, two U.S. missiles slammed into a compound in the Nawai Adda area of North Waziristan, reportedly killing more than 40 Madda Khel tribesmen and Taliban fighters attending a jirga (tribal meeting) to help resolve a dispute between two parties over the sale of a chromite mine that cost approximately $100,000.[18] Among the dead was Sherabat Khan, a senior deputy to Hafiz Gul Bahadar, who was sent to mediate the dispute on behalf of the Taliban. On October 31, up to four missiles fired from a U.S. drone killed four men, including a local chromite trader named Saeedur Rahman, in the Doga Madakhel village in North Waziristan—an area located in the Dattakhel tehsil that is controlled by Hafiz Gul Bahadar.[19] Bordering Khost is Zormat district of Paktia Province, another major hub in the trade of illicit minerals (and narcotics) in eastern Afghanistan. Situated between some of the largest chromite deposits in Afghanistan, namely the Deh Yak district of Ghazni Province and the Dadukhel desert of Logar, Zormat is a hotly contested district where locally operated smuggling syndicates—and linked to those in Khost—dictate the flow of illicit goods destined for larger markets outside the province and in neighboring Pakistan. In Logar Province, there are approximately 20 precious stone mines in addition to the massive Anyak copper mine.[20] Among these are the massive surface deposits of chromite in the Dadukhel desert, located approximately 10 kilometers east of the provincial capital of Pul-i-Alam. In 2006, hundreds of armed men were reportedly extracting chromite ore from the Dadukhel area at night; they smuggled the ore to Gardez and on through the Jaji district of Paktia for destinations in Parachinar, Pakistan.[21] Smugglers in this area often hide their haul of chromite under loads of timber, nearly all of which is bound for bara (contraband) markets in Pakistan. By September 2010, the Afghan Ministry for Mines acknowledged that efforts to secure the chromite fields in Logar have failed just as they have in Khost, with an estimated 400 tons of the precious ore smuggled out of the country every day, in part because the provincial governor and chief of police continue to play integral roles in the area’s black market chromite trade.[22]In addition to chromite extraction and smuggling, small and medium scale **unlicensed extraction** of coal **in** the central provinces of **Bamyan and Baghlan** **has** also **bolstered** the **war chests of** local smuggling **syndicates and criminal networks.** In July 2011, local Afghan media reports suggested that among the 100 coal mines functioning in the central province of Bamyan, the government only controls and operates six of them.[23] Gold, rubies, and emerald extraction continues through unlicensed operators connected to powerful business and political elites in Takhar, Badakhshan, Nuristan, Baghlan, and Panjshir provinces.

Resource extraction alienates local populations- drives them to the Taliban and extraction happens too late to generate mineral wealth. Abi Habib et al[[13]](#footnote-13) ‘12

BAMIYAN, Afghanistan—**Foreign investment in Afghanistan's mining** sector was meant to bring peace and prosperity. But here in Bamiyan province, it **has** so far put locals out of jobs and **fueled a spreading insurgency**. For decades, thousands of Afghans have dug for coal **in** the unregulated mines of **Bamiyan's Kahmard district**, in a valley dotted with timber-framed entrances to dangerous, narrow shafts. This summer, **the Afghan government evicted** these **squatters** **to make way for a Chinese consortium** that has won one of the biggest natural-resources concessions in a country that sits atop vast, largely untapped mineral wealth. The Chinese firm that won the tender, however, hasn't yet replaced the lost jobs with new ones. Many **evicted miners have turned to the Taliban** for a paycheck, leading to a sharp decline in security. The **Chinese investors** now say they **don't know when the situation will improve enough to let them** to start **exploiting the site**. "If people do not have jobs, the insurgents will get these people," said Bamiyan Gov. Habiba Sarabi, adding that the **mining** project **has destabilized** what was once considered **Afghanistan's safest province**. The Taliban fighters that swarmed the area have set up illegal checkpoints and exercise de facto authority in many parts of the district, say local Afghans. "When the government kicked us out from the coal mines, we had no other choice except to join the Taliban," said one miner who declined to be identified and who says he is earning some $30 a day when he is with the Taliban. About 50 other former miners have taken up weapons alongside him, he said. As Afghanistan's bitter winter advances on this mountainous region where freezing to death is common, **the shortage of coal**—used here for heating and cooking—**is further alienating the population.**

"These communities are now ready to fight," said Ali Wardak, a tribal leader who has been trying to negotiate on the matter with Kabul authorities. "The government and the Chinese are moving to a point of no return." Many miners haven't joined the insurgency, of course, leaving some room for hopes expressed in recent years by U.S. officials that mining projects would spur development and bring stability. Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest countries but has trillions of dollars in potential mineral wealth, by U.S. government estimates, from oil to gold to rare earths. The Afghan Ministry of Mines says the summer's closure of 103 illegal mining tunnels in Kahmard was needed to safeguard the area for the Chinese investors and to stop widespread child labor and unsafe practices, some of which have been documented earlier this year by The Wall Street Journal. According to the ministry, 1,000 jobs have been lost. Miners and local government officials say 5,000 to 10,000 people have become unemployed across Bamiyan and in the adjoining provinces of Samangan and Baghlan. "I can't find a job to feed my children. Where will we find the firewood to heat our houses this winter?" said Sakhi Daad Lali, 51, a former laborer in Bamiyan's coal mines and a father of 11. "**People have no choice but to join the Taliban when the government doesn't** do anything to **help them**." The Chinese consortium, led by state-run MCC China Metallurgical Group, won the concession for Bamiyan's coal mines in 2009, along with more lucrative copper deposits of Mes Aynak in Logar province, south of Kabul. The entire deal, details of which are confidential, has been valued at $3.5 billion. Bamiyan's coal is supposed to power a 400-megawatt electricity station that the Chinese group has pledged to build, according to the ministry of mines, with half of that power going to Mes Aynak and the rest feeding Afghanistan's national grid.**The Chinese consortium is supposed to** **start** **developing** **the mines**—estimated to hold 45 million tons of coal—by the spring, with the power station completed **by 2015**, said Afghanistan's deputy minister of mines, Nasir Durrani. Speed is essential, said Gov. Sarabi. "The Chinese company should start work on this as soon as possible so that the people can get jobs," she said.

Instability is imminent- extraction fractures a fragile peace and sparks wars for protection money. Sheraz[[14]](#footnote-14) ‘14

Many resource rich countries are under the shadow of conflict and have the highest levels of poverty, corruption and conflict. Amongst the world0s most mineral dependent states, 11 are heavily indebted and five have had recent civil wars (OECD, 2008). In many mineral-rich developing countries, rent-seeking and corruption tend to be widespread, and in the worst cases the appropriative struggle turns into a full-scale civil war (e.g. civil war in Angola and Sierra Leone over control of precious stones, ironically referred to as blood diamonds). Many civil wars are decided by the inability of one side or another to keep supplying itself, even if it controls part of the country. But civil wars funded by natural resources that can be sold outside the country can continue pretty much indefinitely. Historically, resource-rich countries, particularly those that have other characteristics asso- ciated with conflict, such as poverty and low growth, are much more likely to break out in civil war.Mineral resources provoke various kinds of destructive compe- tition: from rebels within, from states without, and between owners and workers. As mentioned earlier, parasitic **exploitation of Afghanistan’s mineral reserves by militant groups** including the Taliban and opportunistic entrepreneurs **is** already **enhancing the** war chests of the **Taliban** and other armed belligerents. Further- more, **corrupt** government **officials** and illicit business practices, such as paying bribes, already exacerbate the situation and **will continue to fuel corruption** for the foreseeable future. In May 2011, Afghanistan0 s parliament cited security shortcomings, infrastruc- ture and technicality problems as the most serious obstacles in developing Afghanistan0s mining sector (ToloNews, 2011).Given the history of illegal mining and the use of its profits to finance the insurgency in Afghanistan, the headlines of lucrative mining contracts between Afghanistan and mining firms from China and India, take new meaning. In a country, which has been torn by conflict, **the development of a** full-blown **mining industry might take decades, but that** **could** easily **translate into decades of violent competition**. The elected government of Afghanistan is limited in its influence and outside the reach of the weak central government, tribal and ethnic warlords provide rough governance and a semblance of stability. **The Taliban** also **provide** a kind of **governance** **in** the **areas they control**. It is in their interests to maintain some degree of stability in the areas where they are in power, so **there is a fragile balance**. The excavation and **exploita- tion of** valuable **minerals** by multinational companies **might** well **upset that balance and set off a struggle to control** the “**protection” fees** for safe **routing** **of** mineral **resources**, where the minerals are located.

Extinction. Morgan[[15]](#footnote-15) ‘09

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section , Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is **to set off a nuclear exchange**. **As Moore points out,** all that militant **terrorists would have to** do is **get** their hands on **one** small **nuclear bomb and explode it on** either Moscow or Israel. **Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers** should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that **any attack would be blamed on the U**nited **S**tates” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if **Israel** were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it **would retaliate with the** suicidal “Samson option” **against all** major **Muslim cities** in the Middle Ea**st. Furthermore,** the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on **Russia** **and** even “anti-Semitic” **European cities** In that case**, of course**, **Russia would retaliate, and the U.S.** would then retaliate against Russia. **China would** probably **be involved** as well, as thousands, if not **tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads**, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, **would rain upon** most of the major cities in **the Northern Hemisphere**. Afterwards, for years to come, massive **radioactive clouds would drift** throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, **bringing** death **or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a** **nuclear winter that could last** as long as **a 100 years**, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well**. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on.** Any accident**, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason** could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the **likelihood of** a rapid **escalation** of nuclear attacks **is** quite **high** while **the likelihood of** a limited nuclear war is actually less probable **since** **each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy** and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them.

## Advantage 2: Indo-Pak War

India an Pakistan are on the brink of war- US withdrawal post 2014 will cause a flood of insurgents in Kashmir. Daniel and Miglani[[16]](#footnote-16) ‘13

(Reuters) - **Pakistan-based militants are preparing to take on India** across the subcontinent **once** Western **troops leave**[**Afghanistan**](http://www.reuters.com/places/afghanistan?lc=int_mb_1001)**next year**, several sources say, **raising the risk of a** dramatic **spike in tensions between** nuclear-armed rivals **India and**[**Pakistan**](http://www.reuters.com/places/pakistan?lc=int_mb_1001).Intelligence sources in[India](http://in.reuters.com/?lc=int_mb_1001)believe that a botched suicide bombing of an Indian consulate in[Afghanistan](http://www.reuters.com/places/afghanistan?lc=int_mb_1001), which was followed within days last week by **a l**ethal **cross-border ambush** on Indian soldiers in disputed Kashmir, **suggest** that **the new campaign** by Islamic militants **may already be underway**.Members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant outfit in[Pakistan](http://www.reuters.com/places/pakistan?lc=int_mb_1001), the group blamed for the 2008 commando-style raid on Mumbai that killed 166 people, told Reuters they were preparing to take the fight to India once again, this time across the region.And a U.S. counter-terrorism official, referring to the attack in Afghanistan, said "LeT has long pursued Indian targets, so it would be natural for the group to plot against them in its own backyard".**Given the** quiet **backing** - or at least blind eye - that many **militant groups enjoy from Pakistan's** shadowy **intelligence services**, **tensions from a new militant campaign****are bound to spill over.** Adding to the volatility, the two nations' armies are trading mortar and gunfire across the heavily militarized frontier that divides Kashmir, and accusing each other of killing troops.Hindu-majority India and Islamic Pakistan have fought three wars since independence in 1947 and came close to a fourth in 1999. The tension now brewing may not escalate into open hostilities, but it could thwart efforts to forge a lasting peace and open trade between two countries that make up a quarter of the world's population. "With the Americans leaving Afghanistan, the restraint on the Pakistani security/jihadi establishment is going too," said a former top official at India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the external intelligence arm."We are concerned about 2014 in either scenario. If the jihadis (Islamist militants) claim success in Afghanistan, they could turn their attention to us. Equally, if they fail, they will attack in wrath."But **Pakistan**, which has a border with India to the east and with Afghanistan to the west, has concerns of its own. It **sees India's expansive diplomacy in Afghanistan as a ploy** to disrupt it from the rear as it battles its own deadly Islamist militancy and separatist forces. **Vying for influence in** a **post-2014 Afghanistan, it worries about India's assistance** to the Afghan army, heightening a sense of encirclement."I'm shocked by these allegations. Pakistan has its own insurgency to deal with. It has no appetite for confrontations abroad," said a Pakistani foreign ministry official referring to the Indian charges of stirring trouble in Afghanistan and on the Kashmir border."If anything, we are looking at our mistakes from the past very critically. These accusations are baseless. India needs to act with more maturity and avoid this sort of propaganda."Both U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry spoke during visits to India recently of the need for New Delhi and Islamabad to resume their stalled peace process as the region heads into a period of uncertainty.FULL-SCALE JIHADAt the core of that uncertainty is the pullback of militants from Afghanistan as U.S. forces head home. Hafiz Sayeed, founder of the LeT, has left no doubt that India's side of Kashmir will become a target, telling an Indian weekly recently: "Full-scale armed Jihad (holy war) will begin soon in Kashmir after American forces withdraw from Afghanistan." The retreat of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 brought a wave of guerrillas into Kashmir to fight India's rule there.This time **the additional risk will be the rivalry between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan itself,** one that threatens to become as toxic as the 60-year dispute in Kashmir. The LeT has said it is fighting Indian forces in Afghanistan as well.

Decreased Afghans stability causes Indo-Pak war- forces both nations to protect vital strategic interests. Overdorf[[17]](#footnote-17) ‘13

NEW DELHI, India — As 2014 approaches, the Obama administration is busy trying to keep its promise of extracting most US troops from Afghanistan. So far, **the U**nited **S**tates **looks set to bungle** the **negotiations,** ceding ground to the Taliban **to facilitate a quick [US] exit**.**That could push** hostilities into a new phase, in which neighboring adversaries **India and Pakistan** would **[to] vie for influence** over the mountainous, landlocked nation. In a worst-case scenario, experts say, if the US were to truly botch the delicate deal-making, the **rivalry** between the two South Asian nuclear powers **could** fuel ongoing violence — or even **devolve into** a proxy **war**.From New Delhi’s perspective, the options are hardly appealing. India could increase its involvement in Afghanistan and risk getting sucked into a bloody quagmire, or watch its fragile neighbor become a vassal state of Pakistan. India and Pakistan’s jostling in Kabul dates back to the Cold War and before. When war broke out after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan supported rival anti-communist factions. India sided with rebels opposed to Islamic extremism; Pakistan backed the group that eventually became the Taliban. **Since** the Bush administration’s **2001** invasion, however, **the US has pressured India to limit its Afghanistan role**, to prevent Pakistan from withdrawing support for the war and cutting vital US supply lines. With the US now ready to bring its soldiers home, India and Pakistan are again wrangling for control. Both foresee disaster if the other were to gain the upper hand.**Islamabad fears** that **India would use Afghanistan to aid insurgents in Pakistan’s** nearby **Baluchistan province**, where rebellion has simmered since the 1970s. **Pakistan** also regards control over Kabul as vital to its military doctrine of “strategic depth” — under which **[hopes]** **Afghanistan would serve as a refuge where its leaders could lead a counterattack in the event of an Indian invasion**.For its part, **India fears** that **resurgent** Islamic **militancy in Afghanistan will stoke** **violence** **in** Indian-administered **Kashmir**, by providing a safe haven and training ground for militants like Lashkar-e-Taiba, perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Afghanistan is the lynchpin in Sino-Indian and Pakistani relations. Sheraz[[18]](#footnote-18) ‘14

Afghanistan’s one hope was that, eventually, foreign powers would leave it alone and the Afghans would then be forced to make peace among themselves. With the discovery of mineral deposits worth hundreds of billions of dollars, that hope has been extinguished and there is a genuine risk of Afghanistan slipping into greater instability. As the Western powers are considering phasing out of Afghanistan, big new players like China, India, Iran, Russia and Pakistan are having their presence felt. The nature of their presence is different: unexpectedly large demand for raw materials, energy commerce, quest for strategic depth and geo- politics. At the present, a future in Afghanistan without a con- tinuation of foreign interference does not look likely and assigning the buffer zone, a three trillion dollar value, has certainly increased the stakes.Of critical importance is the role of **India and China** **in** any future scenario of Afghanistan mining. Both nations have played the role of Good Samaritan in **Afghanistan** but their **stakes have changed** recently. A Chinese consortium has procured the Aynak copper project and an Indian consortium has been awarded the Hajigak iron ore deposit, securing the minerals for national strategic reasons. What will be the role of these two aspiring super powers in any future scenario of Afghanistan mining, especially the issues of access and evacuation of mineral resources? **China and India do not see eye to eye** on a number of issues. Longstanding **border disputes plague the relationship** and both have different views of Pakistan and its future role in Afghanistan.**Another** critically **important question is** that of t**he** future **role of Pakistan**. Looked upon suspiciously by various stakeholders in Afghanistan; unable to dismantle the infrastructure that has pro- vided funding, training and arms for the Taliban; providing a route for smuggling of illegal minerals from Afghanistan. **Add to this** **the** spread of **radicalism** coupled **with** a lingering **socio-economic crisis** in Pakistan **and we have an** **explosive mix**, which renders the future of the region

Afghan iron is the largest threat to Indo-Pak relations- India is committed to developing a new mine and transporting the ore through Pakistan- Pakistan won’t tolerate increased Indian influence in Kabul. Najafizada and Rupert[[19]](#footnote-19) ‘12

An Indian security guard, cradling a Kalashnikov assault rifle, shadowed two Indian engineers as they inspected the concrete shell of the parliament building they are constructing -- in the Afghan capital of Kabul.Erecting the new seat of government is part of a push by India to seek both profit and a greater strategic role in the nearby country, where Taliban guerrillas battle the government with support from within Pakistan, India’s arch-rival.**India**, having spent $1.5 billion over a decade on Afghan roads, power lines, schools and the parliament, now **is proposing** what may become **Afghanistan’s biggest foreign investment: $11 billion to build an iron mine**, steel mill and railroad.“India is showing its commitment to an unprecedented ambition and role in Afghanistan,” said C. Raja Mohan, a senior fellow at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. “Stabilizing the northwest of the subcontinent, Afghanistan and Pakistan, is absolutely India’s top foreign- policy priority, because most of our threats come from there.” India’s planned Afghan iron mine would help companies such as Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. (JSP) and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (RINL) by giving them shares in an estimated 1.8 billion tons of ore, for which global prices have more than doubled in the past three years. Afghanistan may see its geographic and economic isolation reduced as India follows China in promising money to build the country’s first major railroads. India Backs Karzai As Afghan anger over the shooting of 16 civilians by an American soldier last month increases calls for an accelerated U.S. exit**, India is seeking to position itself as a rival to China** in investment **in Afghanistan** and as an anti-Taliban force to help the government of President Hamid Karzai. “Instability and radicalism in Afghanistan pose a threat to our common security,” Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna said in a December speech at a conference in Bonn on Afghanistan’s future.“The Indian and Chinese investments will contribute to Afghanistan’s stability” as the U.S. withdraws its main combat forces between now and 2014, said Ali Jalali, a professor at the U.S. National Defense University in Washington and a former Afghan interior minister.“They not only will bring jobs and infrastructure, but these two powerful governments will have a greater direct interest in seeing that all actors in Afghanistan behave moderately,” Jalali said in an interview in New Delhi.Hajigak Iron Mine**India’s expanded role in Afghanistan is anchored in its plan to mine iron ore from** mountain ridges at **Hajigak**, 100 kilometers (60 miles) northwest of Kabul. India’s government backed a group of seven Indian state-owned and private companies that won three of four blocks.The Indian group, the Afghan Iron & Steel Consortium, or AFISCO, has offered to build a steel plant and railroad, and in December asked for $7.8 billion in government loans and guarantees, two people with direct knowledge said then.“They have sought certain assurances regarding the financing,” Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai said at a March 21 press conference in New Delhi. “When they made their bid they were confident that they would have the ability to do it,” he said. “This matter is still under discussion.”AFISCO’s biggest owner, state-controlled Steel Authority of India Ltd., or SAIL, hasn’t said when iron production might begin, although the **New Delhi**-based company **says full developmen**t of the mine and railroad **may take eight to 12 years**. Hajigak would be SAIL’s first expansion beyond India. Ore SuppliesThe Afghan deposit would offer needed future ore supplies for other AFISCO partners, such as JSW Steel Ltd. (JSTL), where profits fell in the quarter ending in December after an Indian court banned mining in Karnataka state.**India’s mines ministry has assembled a** second **group** of state companies, including SAIL, National Aluminium Co. Ltd. (NACL) of Bhubaneswar and Kolkata-based Hindustan Copper Ltd. (HCP), **to bid on licenses to mine copper or gold** offered by the Afghan government, according to Mines Secretary Vishwapati Trivedi. That bid may be combined with a separate offer being assembled by private Indian companies, he said in a March 21 interview in New Delhi. The parliament rising on the outskirts of Kabul is further evidence of the broad engagement envisioned by **Singh and Karzai**, who holds two degrees from Himachal Pradesh University in northern India. In October, the two leaders **signed** **a strategic partnership that will** increase the numbers of Afghan students at Indian universities and may **let India train Afghan** army **troops**.Pakistan’s Reservation**For Pakistan’s military**, which dominates national security policy after having ruled the country for more than half the time since independence in 1947, **India’s growing role** in Afghanistan **appears as a threat**, said Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the independent Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad.“We have always this perception that India will use Afghanistan against us,” he said in a phone interview.Since the 1980s, **Pakistan has backed Afghan guerrilla groups** such as the Taliban’s Haqqani network in attacking Afghan governments, including Karzai’s, Gul said March 26. The goal, he said, was **to keep Afghanistan from aligning** too closely **with India** and from reviving old Afghan sovereignty claims over ethnic Pashtun parts of western Pakistan.Pakistani officials, including Interior Minister Rehman Malik, have said for years that Indian spies in Afghanistan foment insurgency by ethnic Baluch and Pashtun guerrillas near the Afghan border. “We have proof to show that,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit in an interview in Islamabad Feb. 9. “We don’t want to say more than that in public,” he said.No ‘Solid Evidence’Gul and other independent analysts, including Rustam Shah Mohmand, a former Pakistani ambassador in Kabul, say there is no evidence for Pakistan’s claim of Indian subversion. “We say these things because of our India-centric policy,” Mohmand said by phone Feb. 24 from the northwestern city of Peshawar. “But we don’t have any solid evidence to prove that.” Taliban or allied Islamic militant fighters killed at least 58 Indians and Afghans in two suicide bombings of India’s embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009. India accused Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, of assisting the first attack, which Pakistan denied. Other Taliban attacks have killed Indian doctors and aid workers in Kabul and construction workers building a highway in southwestern Afghanistan.Defending TrainsKarzai’s government has deployed dedicated troops to protect a Chinese-owned copper mine at Aynak, south of Kabul, Afghanistan’s biggest mining investment now underway. While no Taliban attacks have been recorded there and Afghanistan promises similar protection for India’s iron mine, the railroads envisioned to carry ores would be more difficult to defend against guerrilla attacks.**India’s** AFISCO **intends to** overcome **Pakistani** **suspicions** enough **to transport** the **iron ore back to India** **through Pakistan**, said Sandeep Jajodia, managing director at Monnet Ispat (MISP), a New Delhi-based steel company that is a member of the group. While **Pakistan bars Indian exports across its territory** to Afghanistan, it lets Afghan companies ship to Indian markets and this year relaxed strictures on its own imports of Indian goods.“Shipping the ore via Pakistan is a logical possibility, but it’s a call we will have to take much later, considering how trade relations between India and Pakistan develop,” Jajodia said in a March 27 interview.**India** also **is considering** construction of a rail line from Afghanistan to **Iran’s port of Chahbahar, which would give it a transport route** that **Pakistan can’t control.**There’s more at stake for **India** than a predictable neighborhood. Its **drive for Afghan iron and copper ore is key** **in Singh’s plan to create 100 million jobs** by raising industrial production to 25 percent of GDP **by 2025**, said Gopalaswami Parthasarathy, a retired Indian ambassador who serves on a government task force reviewing India’s national security needs.“**An essential part of our** **long-term national security** is expanding industry,” Parthasarathy said in an interview in New Delhi. “The pacing of this will depend on stability as the Americans manage their end game. But when the time comes we’ll have streams of Indian construction crews, technicians and plant going in.”

Indo-Pak conflict goes nuclear- Indian air superiority forces Pakistan’s hand. Sharma[[20]](#footnote-20) 11

The US ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, argued strongly with her Government to sell Pakistan more F-16 fighter jets to, ironically, prevent a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Patterson, in a 2009 cable, pointed out that **Pakistan is likely to use Nuclear weapons against India in** a matter a few **days if the two countries go to war** with each other again, because Pakistan would start losing the war by then."**To overcome overwhelming Indian military superiority, Pakistan developed** both **its nuclear** and missile **program** and its air power," she wrote two years ago, according to Wikileaks.She pointed out that **India had** nearly **double the number of jets** (736 to 370 jets) that Pakistan has and **many** of them **have the ability to fire missiles at targets that cannot be seen** directly in front or are beyond the visual range. **Pakistani jets,** she points out**, can only fire at targets in sight** and urged the US to help Pakistan overcome the power imbalance.She pointed out that a Pakistan which is evenly or nearly evenly matched with India is less likely to attack India with Nuclear weapons than one which felt it stands no chance."F-16 aircraft, armed with AMRAAM [beyond visual-range missiles], essentially buy time to delay Pakistan considering the nuclear option in a conflict with India. Given India's overwhelming military superiority, this would only be a few days**,** but these days would allow critical time to mediate and prevent nuclear conflict," she said.The Ambassador's comments make it clear that despite political statements on "no first use" of Nuclear weapons, the Americans expect the Pakistanis to use Nuclear weapons against India in case of a war, albeit a few days after the war starts.Patterson pointed out that, as of 2009,Pakistan didn't stand much of a chance of winning a war against India unless it used Nukes."**Pakistan's shortfalls in training and tactics multiply India's edge.** Pakistan also plans to buy/jointly produce 150 inferior JF-17 fighters from China, but it is unclear how they will pay for them. Meanwhile, India plans to acquire 126 multi-purpose fighters (F-18 or equivalent) **that will give India significant new technologies and further expand its air superiority over Pakistan**," she worried.In another cable, she also pointed out that India will not be threatened by the F-16s as it is in the process of buying even more advanced jets."The escalation of Indo-Pak tensions following the Mumbai attacks demonstrated to the Pakistanis that the threat from India still exists. The Pakistani F-16 program, however, will be no match for India's proposed purchase of F-18 or equivalent aircraft," she

The best scientific models indicate even a limited nuclear exchange would cause an agricultural disaster killing billions- my evidence is hyper specific to this scenario. Toon[[21]](#footnote-21) et al 08

Figure 3a indicates changes in global average precipitation and temperature as a function of soot emission, as calculated with the help of a modern version of a major US climate model.6,8 A relatively modest **5 Tg of soot**, which could be **generated in an exchange between India and Pakistan, would** be sufficient to **produce the lowest temperatures** Earth has experienced **in the past 1000 years**—lower than during the post-medieval Little Ice Age or in 1816, the so-called year without a summer. **With 75 Tg of soot**, less than half of what we project in a hypothetical SORT war, **temperatures would correspond to the last full Ice Age**, and **precipitation would decline by** more than **25% globally**. Calculations in the 1980s had already predicted the cooling from a 150-Tg soot injection to be quite large.3 Our new results, however, show that **soot would rise to** **much higher altitudes** than previously believed—indeed, to well above the tops of the models used in the 1980s. As a result**, the time required** for the soot mass **to be reduced** by a factor of *e* **is** about **five years** in our simulations, **as opposed to about** **one** year as assumed in the 1980s. That **increased** **lifetime causes** a more dramatic and **longer-lasting climate response.**The temperature changes represented in figure 3a would have a profound effect on mid- and high-latitude agriculture**. Precipitation changes**, on the other hand, **would** have their greatest **impact** in **the tropics**.6 Even **a** 5-Tg soot injection would lead to **a 40%** precipitation **decrease in** the **Asia**n monsoon region. **South America and Africa** would see a large diminution of rainfall from convection in the rising branch of the Hadley circulation, the major global meridional wind system connecting the tropics and subtropics. Changes in the Hadley circulation’s dynamics can, in general, affect climate on a global scale.

Complementary to temperature change is radiative forcing, the change in energy flux. Figure 3b shows how nuclear **soot changes the radiative forcing at Earth’s surface[the change in the energy flux]** and compares its effect to those of two well-known phenomena: warming associated with greenhouse gases and the 1991 Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption, the largest in the 20th century. Since the Industrial Revolution, greenhouse gases have increased the energy flux by 2.5 W/m2. The transient forcing from the Pinatubo eruption peaked at about −4 W/m2 (the minus sign means the flux decreased). One implication of the figure is that **even a regional war** between India and Pakistan **can force the climate** to a far **greater** degree **than** the **greenhouse gases** that many fear will alter the climate in the foreseeable future. Of course, **the durations** of the forcings **are different**: The radiative forcing **by nuclear-weapons-generated soot might persist for a decade,** but **that from greenhouse gases is expected to last for a century or more, allowing time for the climate system to respond to the forcing.** Accordingly, while the **Ice Age–like temperatures** in figure 3a **could lead to an expansion of sea ice and terrestrial snowpack, they** probably **would not be persistent enough to cause the buildup of global ice sheets. Agriculture responds to length of growing season**, temperature during the growing season, light levels, precipitation, and other factors. The 1980s saw systematic studies of the agricultural changes expected from a nuclear war, but no such studies have been conducted using modern climate models. Figure 4 presents our calculations of the decrease in length of the growing season—the time between freezing temperatures—for the second summer after the release of soot in a nuclear attack.6,8 Even **a 5-Tg soot** injection **reduces the growing season length toward the shortest average range** observed in the midwestern US corn-growing states. Earlier studies concluded that for a full-scale nuclear conflict, “What can be said with assurance . . . is that the **Earth’s human population has a much greater vulnerability to** the indirect effects of nuclear war [including **damage to the world’s agricultural**, transportation, energy, medical, political, and social **infrastructure**], especially mediated **through** impacts on **food productivity and food availability**, than to the direct effects of nuclear war itself.” As a result, “**The indirect effects** could **result in** **the loss** of one to **several *billions* of humans**.Because the soot associated with a nuclear exchange is injected into the upper atmosphere, the stratosphere is heated and stratospheric circulation is perturbed. For the 5-Tg injection associated with a regional conflict, stratospheric temperatures would remain elevated by 30 °C after four years.6–8 The resulting temperature and circulation anomalies would reduce ozone columns by 20% globally, by 25–45% at middle latitudes, and by 50–70% at northern high latitudes for perhaps as much as five years, with substantial losses persisting for an additional five years.7 The calculations of the 1980s generally did not consider such effects or the mechanisms that cause them. Rather, they focused on the direct injection of nitrogen oxides by the fireballs of large-yield weapons that are no longer deployed. Global-scale models have only recently become capable of performing the sophisticated atmospheric chemical calculations needed to delineate detailed ozone-depletion mechanisms. Indeed, simulations of ozone loss following a SORT conflict have not yet been conducted.

## A2 Economy DA

Qniqueness overwhelms the link, timeframe is key.- Lakhani[[22]](#footnote-22) ‘13

Afghanistan has a few very large, world-class mineral deposits, along with medium-sized and smaller deposits found across the country.14 The contract awarded to the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) to develop the Mes Aynak copper mine was the first such major contract to be concluded.15 The negotiation process provided a learning experience for the government about maximizing the positive economic effects of a growing extractive indus- try, minimizing the negative effects, and managing societal expectations of the country’s mineral wealth **Actual government revenue from extraction in Afghanistan is** currently **negligible**, but the total value of mineral deposits is estimated to be between US$1 trillion and US$3 trillion.16 **Operations at Aynak and Hajigak are expected to start in the next five years**, and **revenue from mining**17 **is projected to** continue rising **[rise]** **slowly** thereafter. With growth in the economy likely to slow during the same period owing to the effects of transition, the extractive sector offers an opportunity to boost growth rates by two to three percentage points.18 Earnings from the extractive industries are likely to constitute a significant and important source of government revenue after 2014, particularly in light of the drop in aid levels and a large financing gap between government revenue and expenditures of approximately 25 percent projected for 2021–22. This adverse development in Afghanistan’s budget 19 carries the strong likelihood of political consequences as well. **Revenue projections from mineral extraction**, however, **are** often **difficult to make with** any **accuracy**. **Price fluctuations affect** the **final value** of the product, and **there is no guarantee** that identified **resources can all be extracted, or generate revenue.** The security situation will strongly affect whether the full potential of mining can be realized.In Afghanistan, the copper in Aynak is the first of the mineral reserves to be contracted out for commercial exploitation. It is the country’s first direct experience of large-scale commercial exploitation of solid minerals.20 Experience from around the world—as well as the **recent delays at Aynak** in moving forward with operations—**illustrate**s that political and **social factors** can **impinge upon mining operations and easily** prevent, disrupt, or **halt them**. As **estimates of revenue generation** before exploitation **are often overstated**, public expectations based on these estimates, as well as a lack of understanding regarding the difference between revenue and wealth, may also be premature. The long gestation **period from** the **discovery of deposits to** the **first realization of revenues**—**[is]** **often ten to twenty years**—further distorts public expectations. In fragile countries, failure to meet expecta- tions alone can prove destabilizing.

Prefer this ev:

A. his is the inevitable result of flaws with mineral revenue projection techniques- it’s impossible to estimate final value and he doesn’t account for hidden extractive costs like setting up infrastructure

B. accounts for his ev and concludes aff- even if those industires could provide wealth, that wealth trickles in so slowly and is lost to corruption that he can’t solve

2. T/Worse for stability- weakens state institutions by incentivizing corruption and slush funds- and prefer our evidence on empirical correlation. Lakhani ‘2

The experiences of postconflict countries such as **Cambodiaand Congo**-Brazzaville **illus- trate** that **the existence of mineral wealth does not** easily **translate into strong economic growth.** Positive downstream and upstream effects of extractive industries on the economy can be difficult to generate, particularly in developing countries. Governments often find it difficult to maximize long-term **fiscal revenues**, and it is a common occurrence that rev- enues, when they are produced, **are not reinvested in sustainable development but** instead are **treated as political windfalls**. **Managing a** sudden and relatively short-lived **influx of** large **revenues** presents significant governance challenges in weak institutional settings and often **further weakens** many **state institutions** **and deepens corruption**. Even where mining remains an enclave industry, operating largely separate from the rest of the economy, its contribution to development can still be significant—through fiscal revenues and the build- ing of nondedicated infrastructure that can benefit other forms of economic activity—if the sector is managed well.

Also includes correlative empirical evidence to bolster the causative warrant- means my link is more probable because the theory is manifested in the real world

Outweighs on probability- too many factors lower the net value of mineral deposits. Sheraz[[23]](#footnote-23) ‘14

On the news of the discovery of an abundant natural asset, citizens look forward to economic relief and leaders look forward to the prospect of large increases in public spending. Based on the prevalent economic theory and similar experience in other mineral-rich countries, **there is a** genuine **risk** **of** greatly **over- estimating** the **economic** and strategic **opportunities offered by Afghanistan’s** newly discovered **mineral** **wealth**. A preliminary analysis indicates the value to the Afghan economy of the newly identified mineral deposits **is** likely to be **a minuscule fraction of the generated wealth** (Lipow and Melese, 2011). **Mining i**s an **expensive** **and** **time**-**intensive** process, which can cost hundreds of millions of dollars for a single mining operation. Even in a best case scenario, **it would take more than 5 years** to a decade to transform a mineral deposit to a “shovel-ready” proposition. **After** **that**, even with a good mine, it takes 5–**10 years to recover the investment**. Also security will have to be provided during this time period, which will only serve to increase production costs.In terms of infrastructure and human capital investments, Afghanistan is in the “earliest” stages of any mineral development. **Due to** the country0s **lack of physical and legal infrastructure**, it is clear that **there will be significant** economic **challenges** involved **in extracting** Afghanistan0s mineral **resources** – roads and railway infrastructure will have to be built and equipment and human resource brought in over a long period of time. Also as a land-locked state, **Afghanistan** **is dependent on shipping through neighboring countries** that are **grappling with infrastructure issues and political stability**. This is **likely to result in** relatively **high production costs**, significantly **lessening the net value of** Afghanistan0s **resources** than any estimates of the gross value.

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